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G lobalization has brought not just greater inequali-ties but also chronic economic uncertainty to 
the world’s population. Governments 
have failed to effectively develop or 
adapt social protection systems to 
reduce economic insecurity. They 
have turned to means-testing, be-
havior-testing, selectivity, targeting, 
conditionality, and workfare. Emanci-
patory universalism has been sacri-
fi ced everywhere. 
   In that context, there has been re-
newed interest in universal uncondi-
tional basic income grants, namely 
cash transfers given to all citizens to 
ensure that they have a minimal in-
come. While conditional cash trans-
fers have become popular all over 
the world, the unconditional universal 
alternative has not been adequately 
considered. I joined SEWA (Self-Em-
ployed Women’s Association) in a 
project funded by UNICEF to launch 
pilot studies of the effectiveness of 
such universal income grants in India. 
   In India, public debate on cash ben-
efi ts has been contentious. On one 
side are advocates of food subsidies, 
wishing to extend the Public Distribu-
tion System to 68% of the popula-
tion, as planned in the National Food 
Security Bill, now before parliament. 
Critics believe it will worsen corrup-
tion, cost a vast amount, provide 
low-quality food and be unsustain-
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able. On the other side, advocates of 
cash transfers have been accused of 
wanting to dismantle public services 
and cut social spending. The real 
problem is that existing policies have 
left over 350 million people, about 
30% of the population, mired in pov-
erty, even after two decades of high 
economic growth.
   In that context, in 2011 we launched 
two pilots to test the impact of basic 
income grants, funded by UNICEF, with 
SEWA as coordinator. Results were 
presented at a conference in Delhi on 
May 30-31 (2013), attended by the 
Deputy Chair of the Planning Com-
mission and the Minister for Rural De-
velopment, who is in charge of cash 
transfer policies. A private presenta-
tion was later made to Sonia Gandhi, 
at her request.
   In eight villages in Madhya 
Pradesh, every man, woman, and 
child was provided with a monthly 
payment of, initially, 200 rupees for 
each adult and 100 rupees for each 
child paid to the mother or guardian; 
these were later raised to 300 and 
150 respectively. We also operated 
a similar scheme in a tribal village, 
where for 12 months every adult 
was paid 300 rupees a month, every 
child 150. Another tribal village was 
used as a comparison. 
   The money was paid individually, ini-
tially as cash and after three months 
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into bank or cooperative accounts. 
National and state authorities learned 
the lessons they must follow if they 
are to roll out direct cash benefi ts 
across this vast country.
  In the pilots, villagers were not al-
lowed to substitute food subsidies for 
cash grants. No conditions were im-
posed on recipients. This we regard as 
crucial. Those who favor conditionality 
say in effect they do not trust people 
to do what is in their best interest and 
that the policymaker knows what is.
   The designers of the pilots believe 
basic income grants will work opti-
mally with good public services and 
social investment, and that they 
would operate better if implemented 
through a Voice organization, i.e., a 
body giving members the capacity to 
act in unison. This has been my posi-
tion on basic income for many years, 
i.e., that it will only work optimally 
if the vulnerable have institutional 
representation. So, as a test of this 
claim, in half the villages selected, 
SEWA was operating, while in the 
other half it was not. 
   Critics claim that cash benefi ts would 
be wasteful and infl ationary, and would 
lower growth, by reducing the labor 
supply. Advocates believe they have 
the potential to unlock constraints to 
improved living standards and com-
munity-based economic development.
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   Starting with a baseline census that 
collected data on many demographic, 
social, and economic characteristics, 
and then an interim and fi nal evalu-
ation survey covering the same as-
pects, we studied the impact of the 
basic income grants over eighteen 
months, using randomized control tri-
als (RCT) that compared the results in 
households and villages receiving ba-
sic incomes with the results in twelve 
other “control” villages where nobody 
received the basic incomes. In addi-
tion, over 80 detailed case studies 
giving individual and family accounts 
of experiences were conducted by an 
independent team. 
   We have much more analysis to 
do, but as the conference showed the 
story is fairly clear. Before mentioning 
a few fi ndings, note that contrary to 
some assertions, a majority did not 
prefer subsidies (covering rice, wheat, 
kerosene and sugar), and as a result 
of the experience of basic incomes 
more came to prefer cash to subsi-
dies. Eleven results stand out.
1. Many used money to improve their 
housing, latrines, walls and roofs, and 
to take precautions against malaria.
2. Nutrition was improved, particular-
ly in scheduled caste (SC) and sched-
uled tribe (ST) households. Perhaps 
the most important fi nding was the 
signifi cant improvement in the aver-
age weight-for-age of young children 
(World Health Organization z-score), 
and more so among girls. 
3. There was a shift from ration 
shops to markets, made possible by 
increased fi nancial liquidity. This im-
proved diets, with more fresh vegeta-
bles and fruit, rather than the nar-
row staple of stale subsidized grains, 
often mixed with stones in the bags 
acquired through the shops of the 
Public Distribution System (PDS), the 
government-regulated food security 
system. Better diets helped to ac-
count for improved health and energy 
of children, linked to a reduced inci-
dence of seasonal illness and more 
regular taking of medicines, as well 
as greater use of private healthcare. 
Public services must improve! 
4. Better health helped to explain the 
improved school attendance and per-
formance (fi gure 1), which was also 
the result of families being able to buy 
things like shoes and pay for transport 
to school. It is important that families 
were taking action themselves. There 
was no need for expensive condition-
ality. People treated as adults learn to 
be adults; people treated as children 
remain childlike. No conditionality is 
morally acceptable unless you would 
willingly have it applied to yourself. 
5. The scheme had positive equity 
outcomes. In most respects, there 
was a bigger positive effect for dis-
advantaged groups – lower-caste 
families, women, and those with dis-
abilities. Suddenly, they had their own 
money, which gave them a stronger 
bargaining position in the household. 
Empowering the disabled is a sadly 
neglected aspect of social policy.
6. The basic income grants led to 
small-scale investments – more and 
better seeds, sewing machines, es-
tablishment of little shops, repairs to 
equipment, and so on. This was as-
sociated with more production, and 
thus higher incomes. The positive ef-
fect on production and growth means 
that the elasticity of supply would off-
set infl ationary pressure due to any 
increased demand for basic food and 
goods. It was encouraging to see the 
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Figure 1
CHILDREN IN FAMILIES WITH BASIC INCOMES MORE LIKELY TO IMPROVE SCHOOL 
PERFOMANCE, 2012
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revival of local strains of grain that 
had been wiped out by the PDS. 
7. Contrary to the skeptics, the grants 
led to more labor and work (fi gure 2). 
But the story is nuanced. There was a 
shift from casual wage labor to more 
own-account (self-employed) farm-
ing and business activity, with less 
distress-driven out-migration. Women 
gained more than men.
8. There was an unanticipated reduc-
tion in bonded labor (naukar, gwala). 
This has huge positive implications for 
local development and equity.
9. Those with basic income were more 
likely to reduce debt and less likely to 
go into greater debt. One reason was 
that they had less need to borrow for 
short-term purposes, at exorbitant in-
terest rates of 5% a month. Indeed, 
the only locals to complain about the 
pilots were moneylenders.
10. One cannot overestimate the 
importance of fi nancial liquidity in 
low-income communities. Money is 
a scarce and monopolized commod-
ity, giving moneylenders and offi cials 
enormous power. Bypassing them can 
help combat corruption. Even though 
families were desperately poor, many 
managed to put money aside, and 
thus avoid going into deeper debt 
when fi nancial crises hit due to illness 
or bereavements.
11. The policy has transformative 
potential for both families and vil-
lage communities. The whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts. 
Unlike food subsidy schemes that 
lock economic and power struc-
tures in place, entrenching corrupt 
dispensers of BPL (Below Poverty 
Line) cards, rations, and the numer-
ous government schemes that sup-
posedly exist, basic income grants 
gave villagers more control of their 
lives, and had benefi cial equity and 
growth effects.
   A claim we have made in the pub-
lic debate in India is that universal 
schemes can be less costly than tar-
geted schemes. Targeting, whether by 
the discredited BPL card or by other 
methods, is expensive to design and 
implement. All targeting methods 
have high exclusion errors – evalua-
tion surveys showed that only a mi-
nority of the poorest had BPL cards.
   In sum, basic income grants could 
be a vital part of a 21st-century so-
cial protection system. These are mo-
mentous times in Indian social policy. 
Old-style paternalism must be re-
jected and a new progressive system 
constructed.
Figure 2
INCOME EARNING WORK INCREASED FOR BASIC INCOME FAMILIES, 2011-12
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